

Domande del repository "CEILS_FEB_23"

Totale domande: 60

1 -- 1 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

The Cuba crisis was considered to be one of the most critical points of:

- A (1) The Cold War. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) The War of Independence.
 - C (-0,33) The Great War.
-

2 -- 2 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

What does the term Shoàh mean?

- A (1) The persecution and extermination of the Jews carried out by the Nazi regime. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) The setting-up of concentration camps during the WWII.
 - C (-0,33) The setting-up of gulags under the Stalinist dictatorship.
-

3 -- 3 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

What was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

- A (1) A non-aggression pact drawn up in 1939 between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) A military alliance among socialist states of the Eastern Bloc.
 - C (-0,33) An agreement signed in 1939 by United Kingdom and Soviet Union.
-

4 -- 4 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

According to Parmenides...

- A (1) Being is, non-being is not. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) Being exists only if non-being exists too.
 - C (-0,33) Non-being cannot exist but it can be conceived.
-

5 -- 5 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

According to Augustine, time...

- A (1) Is created along with the world by God. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) Does not exist.
- C (-0,33) Is an infinite Flow.

6 -- 6 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

In which year did Adolf Hitler become chancellor?

- A (1) 1933. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) 1935.
- C (-0,33) 1934.

7 -- 7 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

The Italian Republic was born on:

- A (1) 2nd June 1946. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) 2nd June 1948.
- C (-0,33) 31st December 1947.

8 -- 8 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Socrates wrote...

- A (-0,33) Socrates' Apology.
- B (-0,33) The dialogue entitled The Laws.
- C (1) Nothing. ✓ (Risposta esatta)

9 -- 9 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

What did the Yalta Conference in 1945 define?

- A (1) The political-territorial arrangement and structure of the world after the Alliance's victory. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) The submission plans of Italy, Germany and Spain.
- C (-0,33) The attack on Japan.

10 -- 10 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Which of these countries was not part of the Warsaw Pact?

- A (-0,33) Poland.
- B (1) Federal Republic of Germany. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- C (-0,33) Bulgaria.

11 -- 11 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

The author of the Critique of pure reason:

- A (1) Kant. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) Hegel.
C (-0,33) Marx.
-

12 -- 12 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Considering the Salt March, which of the following claims is correct?

- A (1) It was a non-violent demonstration led by Mahatma Gandhi against British Raj. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) It was a response to the Intolerable Acts, a series of measures imposed on the North American colonies by George III.
C (-0,33) It concerns the struggle for independence on the part of the Baltic Republics.
-

13 -- 13 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Who was the British prime minister at the beginning of WWII?

- A (-0,33) Eden.
B (1) Chamberlain. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
C (-0,33) Churchill.
-

14 -- 14 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

"The only possibility would be to wager on the existence of God; such a wager not being made, should God exist you would lose eternal beatitude, or, should He not exist, you would, in the end, lose nothing". This passage is attributable to the thought of:

- A (1) Blaise Pascal. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) René Descartes.
C (-0,33) Augustin.
-

15 -- 15 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Which among the following is a correct pairing?

- A (1) Marx - Historical materialism. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) Hume - Existentialism.
C (-0,33) Comte - Empiricism.
-

16 -- 16 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

The Fourteen points were...

- A (1) A speech by US President Woodrow Wilson. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) A speech by US President Abraham Lincoln.

C (-0,33) A speech by UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

17 -- 17 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Who said these words? "We ourselves feel that what we are doing is just a drop in the ocean. But the ocean would be less because of that missing drop".

- A (1) Mother Teresa of Calcutta. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) Martin Luther King.
C (-0,33) Abraham Lincoln.
-

18 -- 18 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

What does the Long March refer to?

- A (1) The military retreat by the Chinese Red Army in 1935-1936. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) The retreat by the Italian Alpine Corps from Russia in 1943.
C (-0,33) The retreat by Chinese Nationalist Army after WWII.
-

19 -- 19 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

The term "Decolonization" means:

- A (1) The historical process by which countries, which had previously been colonized, achieved independence. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) The creation by Western powers of conditions of economic dependence of poor countries.
C (-0,33) The abandonment of traditional usages and customs by ex-colonies.
-

20 -- 20 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

What are the features of the philosophical-cultural movement known as Positivism?

- A (1) Faith in science and scientific-technological progress. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) The antithesis of Negativism.
C (-0,33) The coincidence of virtue and goodness with pleasure.
-

21 -- 21 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

According to Descartes, the expression cogito ergo sum (= I think, therefore I am):

- A (1) Expresses the indisputable certainty that man has of himself as a thinking being. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
B (-0,33) Highlights the freedom of thought of each human being.
C (-0,33) Is linked to Classical philosophy, particularly that of ancient Rome.

22 -- 22 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

To whom does the expression Mothers of Plaza de Mayo refer?

- A** (1) The mothers of the desaparecidos ("disappeared") who gathered in this square of Buenos Aires during the military dictatorship (1976-1983). ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B** (-0,33) The mothers of the Republicans who died during the Spanish War.
- C** (-0,33) The mothers of the victims of the Pinochet coup d'état in Chile.

23 -- 23 (Categoria: 1_GENKNOW)

Which of the following statements regarding the Civil War in Italy is NOT correct?

- A** (1) The partisans who took part belonged exclusively to communist groups. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B** (-0,33) It led to the liberation of Milan, Turin and Genoa on April 25th 1945.
- C** (-0,33) It included actions of war, guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

24 -- 24 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

If the power to a computer is cut off, the following information is lost:

- A** (1) in the RAM. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B** (-0,33) in the ROM.
- C** (-0,33) in the Hard Disk.

25 -- 25 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

Which of the following is a browser?

- A** (1) Firefox. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B** (-0,33) Linux.
- C** (-0,33) OS X.

26 -- 26 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

What is a Screen Reader?

- A** (1) software which uses voice synthesis to read text from the screen. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B** (-0,33) a special type of screen which can be used by people who are visually impaired or blind.
 - C** (-0,33) the software used for reading PDF files.
-

27 -- 27 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

Which of the following statements about cookies is false?

- A** (1) they do not allow internet users' navigation to be traced. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B** (-0,33) they are files utilised by web servers to recognise browsers during internet navigation.
 - C** (-0,33) users must be informed that the site uses certain types of cookies.
-

28 -- 28 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

Parental Control Software..

- A** (1) they can monitor websites and the duration of internet access. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B** (-0,33) is prohibited, since it violates the privacy of minors.
 - C** (-0,33) can only monitor access to the computer.
-

29 -- 29 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

Is it always possible to copy data from a DVD-ROM (not video) to a hard disk?

- A** (1) Yes. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B** (-0,33) No, because DVDs have write-protection.
 - C** (-0,33) No, not in any case.
-

30 -- 30 (Categoria: 2_ITSKILLS)

Which of these statements about printing an e-mail with Microsoft Outlook is true?

- A** (1) You can always print e-mail. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B** (-0,33) It is not possible to print e-mail if it is in HTML format.
 - C** (-0,33) It is not possible to print the email present in the deleted mail.
-

Carefully read this excerpt and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

(From H.J. Berman, *Law and Revolution, II, The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition*, Cambridge (Mass.) - London (Engl.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 21-22)

It is because we are at the end of an era that we are able to discern its entire course; and it is because we are at the beginning of a new era of transnational and transcultural interaction that we must search our past in order to find what from its beginning gave it its vitality and what in it can help us meet the challenges of the future.

It is not accidental that in the last decades of the twentieth century, the nationalist legal historiography that predominated in the West prior to the two World Wars began to give way to the study of a transnational European legal history. The study of European legal history, however, taken as a whole, requires a different periodization from that which has been applied to the study of individual national legal systems taken separately. Western history, including Western legal history, has moved in long time spans, with recurrent motifs. It is thus the task of the historian of Western law to establish the right periodization.

Among Western academic historians generally, periodization has often been taken for granted and, indeed, often ignored, as historical researches have tended to become narrower and narrower. In the words of a great - and greatly neglected - twentieth-century scholar, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "scientific" or "objective" historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which places the historian outside of history, led to the continual breaking down of the past into smaller parts and the eventual loss of any sense of direction. The historian, he wrote, should count not only days and years but also, and above all, generations and centuries if he is to "avoid the Scylla of disordered detail and the Charybdis of meaningless generalities." Rosenstock-Huessy's method of periodizing the history of the West was to stress the recurrence of Great Revolutions from the eleventh to the twentieth century, each ultimately building on the experience of its predecessors. I have applied this method to the study of the history of Western law.

Paradoxically, those scholars who, by concentrating on bits and pieces of history, have thought to avoid the necessity of larger periodizations have had imposed on them by academic convention a wrong periodization - namely, the sixteenth-century division of the past into "ancient," "medieval," and "modern" segments. No matter how specialized their fields, historians are in fact identified as working within one or more of these three traditional categories. They have to a certain extent rebelled against such identification by dividing "medieval" into the "Early Middle Ages" of the fifth to the eleventh century and "High Middle Ages" of the twelfth to the fifteenth century, and dividing "modern" into "early modern history" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and "modern history" of the eighteenth century to the World Wars. It seems to have been forgotten that it was the sixteenth-century Lutherans who first popularized the terms "Middle Age" (*medium aevum*, *Mittelalter*) and "medieval" in order to characterize the period between early Christianity and themselves. The term was also congenial to humanists of that time, who used it to characterize the period between classical antiquity and themselves. Today, however, it is wholly unclear what "Middle Ages" are in the middle of.

Especially in speaking about the Western legal tradition, it is important to avoid the use of the anachronistic terms "Middle Ages" and "medieval" to refer to the pre-Protestant period of European history ... Also to be avoided is the eighteenth-century term "feudalism": there had, indeed, been feudal law, governing feudal military relations and feudal land tenure, but these had largely ceased to exist more than two centuries before the French Estates General declared in 1789 that "the feudal regime is abolished." The oppressive aristocratic privileges against which the French bourgeoisie rebelled were, to be sure, survivals of a much earlier time when lord-vassal relations did exist. But even in that earlier time, "feudalism" had not prevailed in the thousands of European cities founded from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, nor did "feudalism" exist in the regime of the "medieval" church or in the flourishing world of "medieval" commerce.

In the text, the author emphasizes that:

A (-0,33) We are at the end of two eras.

- B** (1) We are at the end of an era and at the beginning of a new era. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- C** (-0,33) We are the founders of a new world.
-

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According to Berman, we must search our past...

A (-0,33) In order to know our present.

B (-0,33)

In order to find the reasons of the vitality of future.

C (1)

In order to find the reasons of the vitality of the past itself and to meet the challenges of the future. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**

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The need for a change in the legal historiography began being grasped

A (-0,33) After the 1970s.

- B** (1) After World War II. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
- C** (-0,33) At the beginning of the new millennium.
-

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What does the new European historiography need?

A (-0,33) New and more detailed research.

- B** (-0,33) A new philosophical foundation.
- C** (1) A new periodization. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
-

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According to Berman, what was the main criticism of traditional academic historiography?

A (-0,33) The lack of details.

B (-0,33) The large generality.

C (1) The lack of a sense of direction. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**

Carefully read this excerpt and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

(From H.J. Berman, *Law and Revolution, II, The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition*, Cambridge (Mass.) - London (Engl.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 21-22)

It is because we are at the end of an era that we are able to discern its entire course; and it is because we are at the beginning of a new era of transnational and transcultural interaction that we must search our past in order to find what from its beginning gave it its vitality and what in it can help us meet the challenges of the future.

It is not accidental that in the last decades of the twentieth century, the nationalist legal historiography that predominated in the West prior to the two World Wars began to give way to the study of a transnational European legal history. The study of European legal history, however, taken as a whole, requires a different periodization from that which has been applied to the study of individual national legal systems taken separately. Western history, including Western legal history, has moved in long time spans, with recurrent motifs. It is thus the task of the historian of Western law to establish the right periodization.

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Especially in speaking about the Western legal tradition, it is important to avoid the use of the anachronistic terms "Middle Ages" and "medieval" to refer to the pre-Protestant period of European history ... Also to be avoided is the eighteenth-century term "feudalism": there had, indeed, been feudal law, governing feudal military relations and feudal land tenure, but these had largely ceased to exist more than two centuries before the French Estates General declared in 1789 that "the feudal regime is abolished." The oppressive aristocratic privileges against which the French bourgeoisie rebelled were, to be sure, survivals of a much earlier time when lord-vassal relations did exist. But even in that earlier time, "feudalism" had not prevailed in the thousands of European cities founded from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, nor did "feudalism" exist in the regime of the "medieval" church or in the flourishing world of "medieval" commerce.

What is the basis of the new periodization suggested by Berman?

- A** (1) The series of revolutions which marked Western history. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
- B** (-0,33) The wars in European history.
- C** (-0,33) The different spirits of eras.
-

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According to Berman, traditional periodization (divided in "Antiquity", "Middle Age" and "Modern Era") is wrong...

- A** (-0,33) For legal historians.
- B** (-0,33) For historians of economy.
- C** (1) For all historians. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
-

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The term "Middle Age" has been popularized by...

- A** (1) Lutherans of 16th century. ✓ (**Risposta esatta**)
- B** (-0,33) Jurists of 14th century.
- C** (-0,33) Lutheran Historians of 19th century.
-

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Humanists of the 16th century characterized "Middle Age" as...

- A** (-0,33) The period between the end of the empire of Alexander the Great and the rise of the Roman Empire.
- B** (-0,33) The period between the discovery of the New World and the Council of Trento.
- C** (1) The period between Classical Antiquity and the period in which the humanists were living and operating ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
-

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"Feudalism" means...

- A (-0,33) A peculiar regime which was the basis of European life between the 11th and 18th centuries.
- B (1) A term used by French Estates General to designate all the intolerable privileges they were abolishing in 1789. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- C (-0,33) A peculiar way of exploitation of subjects and lands.
-

41 -- 41 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

Marriage is mainly presented as

- A (1) a fundamental institution in the development of human history. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) a fundamental legal institution only in the federal US system.
- C (-0,33) a part of the system of ethics and morality.
-

42 -- 42 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

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Marriage is viewed as

- A (1) essential for both religious and non-religious people. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) essential especially for religious people.
- C (-0,33) offering unique fulfillment beyond secular and religious realms.

43 -- 43 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

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The Court holds that

- A (1) the value of marriage is higher than the sum of the values of the spouses. ✓
(Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) the value of marriage perfectly corresponds to the sum of the values of the spouses.
 - C (-0,33) the value of marriage is lower than the sum of the values of the spouses.
-

44 -- 44 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

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The Court underlines that

- A (1) the beauty of marriage has been grasped in many different cultures across the centuries. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
 - B (-0,33) the beauty of marriage has been grasped in the Western legal and cultural tradition across the centuries.
 - C (-0,33) the beauty of marriage has been grasped only seldom and with deep divergences in the various cultural environments across the centuries.
-

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:


From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

According to the Court

- A (1) it is fair to say that, traditionally, marriage is based on the union between two persons of the opposite sex.  (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) it is fair to say that, traditionally, marriage is based on the union between two or more persons of different sex.
 - C (-0,33) it is fair to say that, traditionally, marriage is based on the union between two persons in love with each other, regardless of their sex.
-

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

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The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

The Court makes clear that, according to the respondents:

- A (1) marriage should also be considered in the future as the union between two persons of the opposite sex. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) in the future marriage should be considered as a flexible union between two or more persons.
 - C (-0,33) marriage has lost its social importance and it should disappear as a legal institution.
-

47 -- 47 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:


From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

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The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

The Court makes clear that the petitioners:

- A (1) agree with the idea that, traditionally, marriage is based on the union between two persons of the opposite sex.  (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) disagree with the idea that, traditionally, marriage is gender-differentiated, and claim that the sex of the spouses should only be considered as relevant in some circumstances.
- C (-0,33) disagree with the idea that, traditionally, marriage is based on the union between two persons of the opposite sex, because there is not a commonly accepted notion of marriage in the world.

48 -- 48 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See *De Officiis* 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

The Court makes clear that the petitioners:

- A (1) do not aim to demean the idea of marriage. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) are trying to demean the traditional idea of marriage.
- C (-0,33) accept only the gender-differentiated idea of marriage.

49 -- 49 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

The Court makes clear that the petitioners consider marriage as:

- A (1) a source of privileges and responsibilities. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) a useless legal bond.
- C (-0,33) a source of non-ethical limitations to individual freedom.

50 -- 50 (Categoria: 4_BRA2)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Federal Supreme Court Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together. Confucius taught that marriage lies at the foundation of government. 2 Li Chi: Book of Rites 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai eds., J. Legge transl. 1967). This wisdom was echoed centuries later and half a world away by Cicero, who wrote, "The first bond of society is marriage; next, children; and then the family." See De Officiis 57 (W. Miller transl. 1913). There are untold references to the beauty of marriage in religious and philosophical texts spanning time, cultures, and faiths, as well as in art and literature in all their forms. It is fair and necessary to say these references were based on the understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of the opposite sex.

That history is the beginning of these cases. The respondents say it should be the end as well. To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman. This view long has been held and continues to be held in good faith by reasonable and sincere people here and throughout the world.

The petitioners acknowledge this history but contend that these cases cannot end there. Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage, the petitioners' claims would be of a different order. But that is neither their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners' contentions. This, they say, is their whole point. Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves because of their respect and need for its privileges and responsibilities. And their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.

The Court makes clear that, according to the petitioners, same-sex marriage:

- A (1) should be allowed. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) should be prohibited.
 - C (-0,33) should be allowed only after a long period of cohabitation.
-

51 -- 51 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to achieve "viability," i.e., the ability to survive outside the womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life," it found that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard to defend *Roe's* reasoning. One prominent constitutional scholar wrote that he "would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting" if he were "a legislator," but his assessment of *Roe* was memorable and brutal: *Roe* was "not constitutional law" at all and gave "almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."

At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

In this text, abortion is presented as:

- A (1) a profound moral issue on which, in a democracy, it is legitimate to disagree. ✓
(Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) a profound moral issue on which the Supreme Court offered a valuable regulatory response.
 - C (-0,33) a profound moral issue on which it is no longer possible to disagree.
-

52 -- 52 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to achieve "viability," i.e., the ability to survive outside the womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life," it found that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard to defend *Roe's* reasoning. One prominent constitutional scholar wrote that he "would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting" if he were "a legislator," but his assessment of *Roe* was memorable and brutal: *Roe* was "not constitutional law" at all and gave "almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."

At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

On the issue of abortion, the text of the US Constitution

- A (1) is silent and the gap was filled by the Supreme Court in *Roe v. Wade*. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
 - B (-0,33) sets out a scheme in which each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently.
 - C (-0,33) explicitly assigned the power to regulate this profound moral issue to each state, but after 185 years it was amended.
-

53 -- 53 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

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At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

In *Roe v. Wade*, the Supreme Court held that the US Constitution

- A (1) confers a broad right to obtain an abortion on the basis of dubious historical and legal arguments. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) confers a broad right to obtain an abortion on the basis of compelling historical and legal arguments.
- C (-0,33) does not confer a broad right to obtain abortion because 30 states prohibited it at all stages.

54 -- 54 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

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At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

The text expresses an assessment of *Roe v Wade* which is

- A (1) fiercely critical of its outcome and arguments. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) favorable to the outcome, but critical of the arguments.
- C (-0,33) critical of the outcome, but favorable to the arguments.

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to achieve "viability," i.e., the ability to survive outside the womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life," it found that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard to defend *Roe's* reasoning. One prominent constitutional scholar wrote that he "would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting" if he were "a legislator," but his assessment of *Roe* was memorable and brutal: *Roe* was "not constitutional law" at all and gave "almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."

At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

Under *Roe v. Wade*, the right to obtain an abortion

- A (1) cannot be restricted before "viability". ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) extends in principle until the end of the second semester of pregnancy, but the States can restrict it because they have a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life".
- C (-0,33) cannot be restricted because the Court did not consider the interest in protecting "potential life" legitimate.

56 -- 56 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text**:

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, corresponded to the point at which a fetus was thought to achieve "viability," i.e., the ability to survive outside the womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life," it found that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard to defend *Roe's* reasoning. One prominent constitutional scholar wrote that he "would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court end[ed] up drafting" if he were "a legislator," but his assessment of *Roe* was memorable and brutal: *Roe* was "not constitutional law" at all and gave "almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."

At the time of *Roe*, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of the States had liberalized their laws, but *Roe* abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State. As Justice Byron White aptly put it in his dissent, the decision represented the "exercise of raw judicial power," 410 U. S., at 222, and it sparked a national controversy that has embittered our political culture for a half century.

Criticism against *Roe v Wade*

- A (1) extended even beyond the circle of the opponents of abortion, based on the fact that the Court had usurped the prerogatives of the legislature. ✓ **(Risposta esatta)**
 - B (-0,33) remained confined to the circle of abortion opponents.
 - C (-0,33) was shared even by abortion supporters, because that judgment was memorable and brutal.
-

57 -- 57 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

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From this excerpt, it is fair to infer that its author

- A (1) agrees with Justice Byron White. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) would vote for a statute very much like the one the Court drafted if he were "a legislator".
- C (-0,33) favors the prohibition of abortion at all stages.

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

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Roe v Wade ended up

- A (1) imposing a highly restrictive regime on States' political prerogatives. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) imposing a highly restrictive regime of women's rights on the entire Nation.
- C (-0,33) imposing a highly restrictive regime of abortion on the entire Nation.

59 -- 59 (Categoria: 5_BRA3)

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Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed. For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey of history ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.

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At the time of *Roe v Wade*

- A (1) abortion was possible in some form in at least 16 states. ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) abortion was possible in some form in about half of the states.
- C (-0,33) there was a clear trend towards the liberalization of abortion.

Carefully read this excerpt from the judgment of the US Supreme Court *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* (2022) and answer the questions below **using only the information provided in the text:**

Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which Americans hold sharply conflicting views. Some believe fervently that a human person comes into being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life. Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion invades a woman's right to control her own body and prevents women from achieving full equality. Still others in a third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed.

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Justice Byron White's dissent in *Roe v Wade*

- A (1) viewed that decision as the "exercise of raw judicial power". ✓ (Risposta esatta)
- B (-0,33) is regarded by the author of the text as the "exercise of raw judicial power".
- C (-0,33) sparked a national controversy that has embittered American political culture for a half century.